State Regulation of Nonresident Alien Inheritance: An Anomaly in Foreign Policy by Editors, Law Review
COMMENTS
sif,34 that a trial judge could not properly explain the meaning of "direct
cause," a term which the court equated with "proximate cause," to the jury.3S
However, even had the jury completely understood the concept of proximate
catuse, and had the plaintiff so worded his interrogatory, it is doubtful whether
this would have made any difference in the jury's answer. Under common-
sense principles, one cannot attribute to the jury a subtlety of thought which
would distinguish between remote and proximate cause.36 When the jury
answered plaintiff's interrogatory, it almost assuredly did so with regard to what
it considered not "a" cause, but "the" cause.
Thus, in applying the rules of interpretation outlined above, the Ohio court
twisted the jury's special finding into a form completely alien to its plain and
simple meaning. So long as the courts carry the reconciliation doctrine to the
lengths it was carried in the McNees case, the value of the special interrogatory
as a check on the power of the jury in rendering a general verdict will be greatly
reduced, if not completely subverted.
STATE REGULATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIEN
INHERITANCE-AN ANOMALY IN
FOREIGN POLICY
Any discussion of the right of nonresident aliens to inherit American property
elicits several conflicting considerations. Everyone agrees that, with some excep-
tions, a testator should be permitted to dispose of his possessions in any way he
chooses, and that the interest of a beneficiary should be protected.' However,
a feeling persists that devises and bequests should not be permitted to enrich
34 '54 Ohio St. 154, 93 N.E. 2d 672 (195o).
3s The trial court had submitted the following interrogatories:
"No. x-Do you find the driver of the bus was negligent?"
"No. 2-If the answer to interrogatory No. i is 'yes,' of what did his negligence consist?"
"No. 5-Do you find that the plaintiff, Charles Daniel Brady was negligent in any respect
which was the direct cause of his injuries?"
"No. 6-If the answer to interrogatory No. 5 is 'yes,' of what did his negligence consist?"
The jury answered No. i, "Yes." The answer to No. 2 was, "negligence on the part of the
defendant that door of bus was accidentally opened." No. 5 was answered "Yes," and No. 6,
"We find plaintiff was negligent to a lesser degree than defendant, due to his position in the
bus." The trial judge then informed the jury that there was no apportionment of negligence
in Ohio, and also explained the concept of direct cause. He requested that the jury reconsider
and revise its answer to the sixth interrogatory. The foreman asked for interrogatory five as
well, stating: "We didn't understand interrogatory No. 5 about the direct cause." The jury
then returned with a negative answer to five, making it unnecessary to answer the sixth ques-
tion. The supreme court held that the judge's explanations were improper and granted a new
trial.
36 The statement of the dissenting judge is instructive here. Note 30 supra.
'See McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, i4 Ili. L.
Rev. 536 (igig).
TEE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
"unfriendly" nations or defeat the aims of American foreign policy.2 Notions of
fairness lead to the belief that all persons, citizens or not, should have equal
opportunities to acquire and inherit property.3 On the other hand, distrust of
aliens may give rise to a desire to discriminate.4 Although these considerations
tend to intermingle, it will be helpful to bear each in mind during an examina-
tion of what some courts and legislatures have done in withholding property
from, or in disinheriting, alien beneficiaries.
I
New York, in 1939, s and New Jersey, in i940,6 enacted statutes having the
twofold purpose of protecting alien beneficiaries and fulfilling the intent of the
testator.7 The New York statute provides:
Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee, or beneficiary of a trust would
not have the benefit or use or control of the money or other property due him, or
where other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payment should
be withheld, the decree may direct that such money or other property be paid into the
Surrogate's Court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, or beneficiary of a
trust ..... 8
The New Jersey act contains substantially the same language. Both laws re-
sulted from legislative indignation at confiscations by National Socialist Ger-
many of property of "racial," religious, and political minorities.
German residents of Jewish descent, for example, were effectively prevented
from receiving their shares in the estates of relatives who had died abroad.The
German consul-general, equipped with a power of attorney, would appear dur-
2This policy is clearest, of course, in time of war. The Trading With the Enemy Act, 40
Stat. 41i (1917), as amended, 5o U.S.C.A. §§ I-3r (App., 1949), prohibits the sending of money
or other property to enemy alien devisees and legatees. Difficulties arise when the United
States is not at war with the alien's government, because money remitted to "unfriendly"
nations may ultimately be used against this country.
3Most states have enacted statutes removing the rigid common-law restrictions on alien
inheritance. Gibson, Aliens and the Law 179-81 (194o). It is questionable, however, whether
the states were motivated entirely by a feeling that aliens should be accorded the same treat-
ment as citizens. One factor was the desire to have more aliens come to this country and settle
land. Thus, many states permit aliens to inherit real property, but further provide that they
must become residents and citizens of the state within a certain period in order to retain the
property. See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 6, §§ 1, 2.
4 At common law, aliens were not permitted to inherit real property because it was thought
they could not bear proper loyalties to the state. Aliens "are not allowed to have any in-
heritable blood," said Blackstone, "upon a principle of national or civil policy." 2 BI. Comm.
*249. There were, however, no similar prohibitions on succession to personalty by aliens.
s N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Thompson, Supp., 1942 ) § 269.
6 N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp., 1940) tit. 3, c. 26, § 2.x.
7While this comment will refer only to the policy concerning testamentary intent, it should
be remembered that a similar consideration governs when property passes by intestacy. In-
stead of fulfilling the intent of the testator, the legislature or court attempts to implement
the "intent" of the intestacy statute.
8 N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Thompson, Supp., 1942) § 269.
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ing the New York probate proceedings to "represent" a beneficiary.9 The bene-
fit, when transmitted, was somehow channelled into the German treasury.10 The
testator's wishes had not been followed, and the beneficiary had been disin-
herited. Some courts refused to allow the consul-general to act as intermediary
in view of the world situation."' Most courts, however, were unwilling to
withhold benefits in the absence of legislation.12
The New York courts seized upon the new legislative directive, interpreting
it broadly and applying it extensively. An early decision held that property
should be withheld from a beneficiary whenever confiscation appeared "con-
tingently possible."3 Residents of countries under German domination were
brought within the statute; thus, benefits from decedents' estates were with-
held from most Europeans in the early 1940's. At the same time, New York
courts denied legacies to residents of the Soviet Union,4 on several grofinds,
including the real or supposed peculiarities of the Soviet system of inheritance, 5
and the Soviet policy of paying legacies in devalued currency. 6
The early decisions involving beneficiaries in Soviet-controlled countries
clearly express a consideration which the courts did not spell out in other cases.
The courts were unwilling to transmit property which might assist the Soviet
9 The treaty with Germany, 44 Stat. 2132 (1923), permits the consular officer to remit the
beneficiary's property, but further provides that the consul must "furnish to the authority or
agency making distribution through him reasonable evidence of such remission." The New
York courts held that this qualification prevented the German consul-general from handling
the beneficiary's property. In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 524, 529, i5 N.Y.S. 2d
252, 257-58 (1939). If it were not shown that the beneficiary was prevented from receiving his
property, the consul was permitted to transmit it. In re Blasi's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 587,
iS N.Y.S. 2d 682 (i939). See 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 443 (1942); Santo-
vincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
olIn re Weidberg's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 524, i5 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (i939). Consult Hol-
lander, Confiscation, Aggression, and Foreign Funds Control in American Law 127-28 (1942).
"1 The Pennsylvania courts went furthest in protecting alien beneficiaries without the help
of legislation. One court, speaking of the beneficiaries, declared: "If nobody else is going to
protect them, the law of Pennsylvania will." In re Stede's Estate, 38 Dist. & Co. (Pa.) 209,
212 (194o). See Hollander, op. cit. supra note io, at 124-26; In re Little's Estate, 43 Dist. &
Co. (Pa.) 285 (194i).
X2Hollander, op. cit. supra note io, at 122-27.
13 In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 524, i5 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (1939).
14In re Bold's Estate, 173 N.Y. Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (194o); In re Landau's Es-
tate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 651, i6 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1939).
25 One court stated: "It is a matter of common knowledge that private ownership of prop-
erty has been abolished in the Soviet Union," and withheld funds due a Soviet distributee. In
re Landau's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 651, 653, r6 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 6 (1939). The Soviet Union has
not abolished private ownership of property, however, and the Soviets do have a system of in-
heritance, although the class of possible inheritors is more limited than in common-law coun-
tries. Hazard, Soviet Law: An Introduction, 36 Col. L. Rev. 1236, 1255 (1936); i Gsovski,
Soviet Civil Law 627-50 (1948).
x6 In one case, for example, the court stated that a Soviet distributee whose share was
$i5oo.oo would receive only $3oo.oo in rubles, the remainder being confiscated by the Soviet
government. In re Bold's Estate, 173 N.Y. Misc. 545, x8 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (1940).
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Union.Y1 The emphasis in these cases shifted from a desire to assist beneficiaries
to a policy of not assisting "unfriendly" nations. This latter approach was ap-
parently abandoned in 1945, when Soviet legatees and distributees were per-
mitted to withdraw funds which had previously been withheld.,8 The courts de-
cided that a new Soviet law permitted the beneficiaries involved to receive the
full enjoyment of their property. 9
The early New York attitude toward residents of Soviet-controlled countries
has recently been adopted by a New Jersey court.20 The New Jersey statute,2'
dormant for ten years, was resurrected in 195o and used to withhold funds from
a Hungarian legatee, the court citing with approval the early New York de-
cisions and disregarding later New York cases.- The court declared that a com-
munist system per se would not permit beneficiaries full enjoyment of their
benefits.23 Such a declaration is unfortunate. In making judgments about po-
litical systems, in deciding the cases on the basis of a comparison to our own
system of inheritance, courts drift away from the aims of the legislatures. In-
stead of determining an appropriate means of carrying out the wishes of the
testator, the courts try to withhold aid from those countries whose political
systems they dislike. Doubtless, refusal to transmit property normally going to
an alien beneficiary, whether he would have received the benefits or not, will
have some effect upon relations between this country and that of the alien bene-
ficiary. Interruption of the flow of property by state legislatures and courts
consciously implementing their views of the beneficiary's government will even
more clearly have such an effect.
The New York and New Jersey legislatures expressed a desire to aid the
alien beneficiary and to carry out the intent of the testator. An entirely differ-
ent attitude is indicated by the "reciprocity statutes," popular among the west-
ern states.2 4 California's Probate Code, typical of these statutes, provides that
"7 Sometimes the beneficiaries were treated as potential enemies. One court feared that
funds remitted to the Soviet Union would be used to sabotage American industry. In re Lan-
dau's Estate, 172 N.Y. Misc. 651, i6 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1939).
i8 In re Landau's Estate, 187 N.Y. Misc. 925, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 17 (1946); In re Alexandroff's
Estate, 6i N.Y.S. 2d 866 (x945); In re Adzericha's Estate, 6x N.Y.S. 2d 867 (1945).
'9 The courts also gave weight to a certificate presented by the Soviet ambassador stating
that Soviet beneficiaries were permitted full benefit, use, and control of property sent them.
In re Alexandroff's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (945).
20 The testator had named a Catholic orphanage in Hungary as residuary legatee. At the
time of the probate proceedings, the orphanage was under state control. The.court decreed
that funds should be withheld pending determination of whether the orphanage was the same
institution as that named by the testator, and whether it would receive full benefit of the funds.
In re Url's Estate, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 71 A. 2d 665 (1950).
21 N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp., 1940) tit. 3, c. 26, § 2.1.
In re Url's Estate, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 473-76, 71 A. 2d 665, 676-77 (1950).
'3 The court described the Soviet property system in the language of In re Landau's Estate,
172 N.Y. Misc. 65i, 653, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 6 (1939), quoted supra note I5.
'4 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) c. 39, § iii; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1931) § 259; Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. (Choate & Wertz, 1947) tit. 9i, c. 5, § 520; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp., i93i-4i )
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the right of a nonresident alien to inherit property situated in the United States
is dependent upon a reciprocal right extended to American citizens by the
alien's government. 25 If no such reciprocal right exists, the alien is disinherited,
and his intended benefit is treated as lapsed.
A dissimilarity to the New York and New Jersey statutes is apparent.
In a brief submitted by the United States, the California act is described as "not
an inheritance statute, but a statute of confiscationand retaliation."'26 The Cali-
fornia courts have thus disinherited all nonresident aliens whose governments
do not treat American citizens in the manner prescribed in the statute.27 There
was no attempt to protect the interests of the alien or to effectuate the wishes of
the testator.
II
When states legislate on aliens' rights to legacies, they are entering an area
usually thought to belong exclusively to the federal government. The executive
department of the federal government is charged with the conduct of foreign
affairs, free from state interference. 28 The states do, however, retain exclusive
control over matters of decedents' estates.2 9 When these two areas of the law
overlap, as they surely must where alien beneficiaries are concerned, conflict is
likely to result. State courts applying a reciprocity rule must sit in judgment
on a foreign government, and decide whether it treats American citizens in a
prescribed manner. The alien beneficiary, often through a representative of his
§ 9894; Okla. Stat. (194i) tit. 6o, § 121; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) tit. 6x, c. T, § io7.
Compare Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 7166; La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1932) art. 149o; Tex.
Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art. x66, i77.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Namba v. McCourt, i85 Ore. 579, 204 P. 2d 569 (i949),
found an Oregon statute withholding from aliens ineligible to United States citizenship the
right to acquire interest in Oregon land invalid because it infringed the "equal protection"
and "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oregon's reciprocity statute was
contained in the same chapter in which the land laws appeared. Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940)
tit. 6r, c. i. The court found the entire chapter unconstitutional. Apparently the Oregon
legislature felt that the reciprocity statute was excluded from the court's finding, however,
for it repealed all the sections of the chapter except the reciprocity provision (Section To7).
Ore. L. (i949) c. 350.
2s Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1931) § 259.
26In re Bevilacqua's Estate, i6i P. 2d 589, 593 (Cal., 1945).
27 An alien beneficiary was disinherited if he failed to present convincing evidence that
reciprocity existed. In re Bevilacqua's Estate, i61 P. 2d 589 (Cal., 1945) (Italian beneficiary);
In re Corcofingas' Estate, 24 Cal. 2d 517, 150 P. 2d 194 (i944) (Greek beneficiary); In re
Michaud's Estate, 53 Cal. App. 2d 835, 128 P. 2d 595 (1942) (French beneficiary); see In re
Thramm's Estate, 67 Cal. App. 2d 657, 155 P. 2d 9ig (I945) (German beneficiary).
28 "Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively. It need not be so exercised as to conform to state laws or state poli-
cies. . . ." United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 3oiU.S- 324, 331 (1937).
39 Consequently, a state may grant inheritance rights to all aliens, Blythe v. I-inckley, iSo
U.S. 333 (r9oI), or may, conversely, deny inheritance rights to all aliens. Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197 (1923).
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government, has the burden of persuading the court that reciprocity exists be-
tween the two governments. 30 Even if the alien wins his case, consular repre-
sentatives of his government have gone through considerable expense and incon-
venience, merely to convince a court that their nation will accord fair treatment
to United States citizens.31 If the alien loses, the state court may have ruled
that the foreign representatives have incorrectly stated their own inheritance
law. Our State Department, maintaining friendly relations with the alien's
government, may well be embarrassed by the "unfriendly" action of the state
court.32 The latter may appear to the alien's government to be the action of the
entire nation. In any event it is likely to engender resentment. American inter-
ests abroad may thus be materially affected by a retaliatory state statute pur-
porting to regulate inheritance only.
The New York statute was not retaliatory, but was aimed primarily at im-
plementing the intent of the testator. Nevertheless, this type of legislation, de-
priving a foreign government of property it would otherwise have received,
could disrupt a uniform foreign policy as much as any reciprocity statute. The
beneficiary's government will resent the deprivation, regardless of what con-
siderations have brought it about.
The federal government has never objected to the New York law, however,
apparently because its application has not conflicted with federal statutes.
When federal regulations freezing foreign assets in this country went into effect
in J940,33 the New York courts found themselves working within a framework
of controls which had no effect on the operation of the state statute. The prop-
erty was, as before, deposited with a named public officer in New York and held
for the beneficiary.34 In addition to satisfying the New York statute, however,
the alien had to secure a Treasury Department license to remove his property
from the blocked account. Both could usually be accomplished in the same way.
If the alien could prove that he had satisfied the New York statute by placing
himself in a position to receive the full benefit of his property, it was virtually
30 The California Probate Code (Deering, 1931) § 259.1, originally placed upon the alien
the burden of convincing the court that reciprocity existed. In 1945, the act was amended to
shift the burden to the person contesting the alien's right to inherit. In 1947, the act was
was amended again to place the burden back upon the alien beneficiary. In re Giordano's
Estate, 85 Cal. App. 2d 588, 193 P. 2d 771 (X948). Other states have placed the burden of per-
suasion upon the alien. Bottomly v. Meagher County, 114 Mont. 220, 133 P. 2d 770 (1943);
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp., 1931-41) § 9894.01; In re Braun's Estate, 161 Ore. 503, goP. 2d
484 (1939).
31 The Danish Consul-General in Chicago and the staff of the Danish legation at Wash-
ington, for example, took part in the case of In re Nielsen's Estate, ix8 Mont. 304, 165 P. 2d
792 (1946). The Netherlands Embassy also has interceded on behalf of its nationals. In re
Blak's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 232, 150 P. 2d 567 (1944).
3" The United States Attorney General has stated that the California statute "will be a
recurrent source of diplomatic friction." Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (r947), petitioner's
brief at 75.
33 Exec. Order No. 8389 (April io, I94O), i Code Fed. Reg. 128 (Supp., 394o).
34In re Plemich's Estate, 176 N.Y. Misc. 56o, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 86 (1941).
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certain that the federal government would have no objections to releas-
ing it.35
Nor was the New York statute an obstacle to federal action during the war.
When the Office of the Alien Property Custodian was established in 1942,36
many alien beneficiaries found the protection of the New York law removed
from them. All property due enemy aliens would be vested indefeasibly in the
Custodian.37 The New York law operated to place assets due an enemy bene-
ficiary in a special account, to be held for him until after the war. The Alien
Property Custodian then vested in himself all rights to the property, placing
it forever beyond reach of the alien. 38
Under the reciprocity statutes, an entirely different situation was presented.
If the statute of California, for example, were effectively applied, the alien's
benefit lapsed. There were no assets for the Custodian to impound. The federal
government, therefore, attacked the reciprocity statutes at every opportunity.
One line of attack was to contend that the enemy country involved did grant
inheritance privileges to United States citizens.39 The courts, however, often did
not follow the federal government's recommendations.4O
Another line of attack on statutes of the California type was to contend
that they were unconstitutional on two grounds: first, because they violated
treaty provisions with the country concerned; and, second, because they were
an improper incursion by the states into the foreign policy field. In Clark v.
Allen,4' the United States Supreme Court rejected the second contention com-
3S If, for example, the alien could manage to come to the United States, property could be
released without violating the freezing regulations. Nor would the New York statute be a
bar, since the alien would now have control of his property. See In re Alexandroff's Estate,
46 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (i944). This means could not be used to circumvent the California statute,
however. Under California's Probate Code, the benefit would lapse immediately, and no change
of position could alter the alien's legal status.
36 Exec. Order No. 9o95 (March ii, 1942), 7 Fed. Register 1971 (1942).
37 Clark v. Continental Nat'l Bank of Lincoln, Neb., 88 F. Supp. 324 (Neb., 1949); Clark
v. Edmunds, 73 F. Supp. 390 (Va., 1947); Application of Miller, 288 Fed. 76o (C.A. 2d, X923).
Payment to the Custodian could not be avoided by providing in the will that the executor
should hold the property in trust until such time as conditions abroad had improved. In re
Reiner's Estate, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (1943). Such a provision would satisfy the requirements of
the New York statute, however. One testator copied the language of the New York law into
his will; the court held that while the legacy need not immediately be impounded pursuant to
the state statute, the Custodian might confiscate it if he wished. In re Van Dam's Estate, 43
N.Y.S. 2d 184 (z943).
38 The beneficiary may, however, contend that he was not an enemy alien within the
meaning of the statute. The Custodian had provided administrative remedies, subject to
judicial review, to correct improper seizures. Moreover, Congress and the Custodian were
empowered to order, at a later date, compensation for seizures. Domke, Trading with the
Enemy in World War II 260-72 (1943).
39 The United States claimed that "on July 1, 1941, there was no civilized nation which
did not grant to citizens of the United States the right to inherit from its nationals, with
limitations, however, upon the inheritance of real property." In re Bevilacqua's Estate,
16i P. 2d 589, 595 (Cal., 1945).
40 See, for example, ibid., at 595-96. 41331 U.S. 503 (1947).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
pletely, and further held that under the treaty with Germany,42 the application
of the California statute was only partially excluded.
The United States had claimed that California, by preventing a German
national from inheriting an estate composed of real and personal property, had
violated a treaty between Germany and the United States. The Court, interpret-
ing the provisions of that treaty, concluded that under the circumstances of
the case, California could prohibit the transmission of personal property to a
German national, but that it was prevented by the treaty from restricting the
right to inherit realty.43 Since the language used in the German treaty is
identical to that used in eighteen other treaties now in force,44 the rule of
Clark v. Allen is of wide application. Such a rule permits a state to deny all bene-
fits to aliens in the majority of cases, since legacies of money, corporate shares,
and bonds comprise much of the property left to aliens.45
In answer to the foreign-policy contention, the Court declared that the regu-
lation of inheritance is a function of the states, and, so long as there is no over-
riding federal policy in the form of a treaty, the state law will be controlling.
The state of California had not negotiated with a foreign government, or
entered into any compacts in violation of Article I, Section io of the Constitu-
tion. The Court admitted that California's action "will have some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries. But," the Court continued, "that is true of
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line."46
While state legislation does often affect an area of the law delegated to the
national government, once that government decides to act, its laws are superior
to those of the states. 47 When the Court in Clark v. Allen held that state regula-
tion of alien succession was permissible, since the federal government had not
yet formulated a definite policy, the Court assumed that such a policy could
exist only in a codified way, as in a treaty. Actually, however, the federal gov-
ernment promulgates a policy in an informal way during its everyday relations
with a given country. If the federal government has adopted an official attitude
of friendliness toward a foreign nation, then a state statute which serves to
42 44 Stat. 2132 (1923).
43 The treaty with Germany, 4 4 Stat. 2132 (r923), the Court said, prevented a state from
interfering with the right of German nationals in this country to bequeath personalty to
German nationals who resided in Germany, but did not prevent a state from curtailing an
American citizen's right to bequeath personalty to German nationals. The result may have
been different if the word "person" had been used instead of "national," as it was in the clause
concerning realty. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514, 515 (i947).
44 These treaties are listed by Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal
Property, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 313, 314 (i95o).
45 Ibid.
46 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (i947).
47 Pennsylvania, for example, enacted a statute providing for a system of alien registration
that was stricter than that provided by the federal government. The statute was held un-
constitutional in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
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create any sort of ill will may properly be considered an unwarranted incursion
by that state into the foreign affairs field.4
It is difficult to determine just how "incidental or indirect" an effect state
action of this sort will have. But the fact that the states were prompted to en-
act these laws indicates that the flow of property to alien beneficiaries must be
sizable and steady, and that the governments concerned will certainly not be
uninterested. A decision to cut off the flow should, therefore, be made with an
understanding of the over-all problem, with the interests of the entire nation in
mind, and with a realization of the consequences which might follow.49 It
should, in other words, be made by the federal government.
UNCOMMUNICATED THREATS
An uncommunicated threat is traditionally defined as the expression of an
intention to harm a particular person which is never communicated to that
person.' The threat comes before the court when the person who made it has
been killed. The person toward whom the threat was directed is charged with
murder and offers evidence of the threat in an attempt to substantiate his plea
of self-defense. Uncommunicated threats are relevant to this issue because the
expressed intention of the deceased tends to establish that he was the ag-
gressor.
2
48 In discussing the relation between Congress and the President in the foreign affairs field,
the Court has stated: "Not only... is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise
of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, compli-
cated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as
a representative of the nation." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(i936). The states have been prohibited from interfering with the federal executive also. Thus,
a state cannot refuse to give effect to the acts of recognized governments. United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (i941); United States v. Belmont, 3oi U.S. 324 (i937). Nor can states
refuse to grant sovereign immunity to an agency of a recognized government. Mexico v.
Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E. 2d 577 (i944); see Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
28r N.Y. 362, 24 N.E. 2d Si (1939). In line with its disposition to treat executive power as
supreme in the field of foreign affairs, were the Court to decide that friendly relations with
a foreign nation constitute a definite executive policy, state disability would seem to follow.
49 In holding unconstitutional a California statute regulating immigration, the United
States Supreme Court asked: "If [the United States] should get into a difficulty which would
lead to a war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?"
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875).
1 The courts do not define uncommunicated threats, but the definition given is implicit
in the application of the term to particular fact situations. Typical uncommunicated threat
situations are: the deceased said that "he would kill defendant before he went to bed that
night." Wiggins v. Utah, 93 U.S. 465, 470 (1876); "If I run in with him I am going to beat his
brains out with this." (The speaker was swinging a rope with a half-pound weight attached
while he spoke.) Salter v. State, 76 Ga. App. 209, 45 S.E. 2d io6 (1947); "So sure as my name
is Jim Fisk [it was] I will kill him." Stokes v. New York, 53 N.Y. x64, 174 (1873).
2 Wiggins v. Utah, 93 U.S. 465 (1876); State v. Vernon, 197 La. 867, 2 So. 2d 629 (194r);
Banks v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 647, 126 S.W. 2d 1122 (i939); Trapp v. New Mexico, 225
Fed. 968 (C.A. 8th, 1915); Stokes v. New York, 53 N.Y. 164 (x873).
Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the truth of the proposition sought to be proved
